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Joseph Persky, Daniel Felsenstein, and Virginia Carlson

What Are Jobs Worth?
NOTE: This article highlights some of the research
ﬁndings that appear in the authors’ new book, Does
“Trickle Down” Work? which is available this
summer from the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7).

H

ow much are jobs subsidized by
state and local governments really worth?
Policymakers have achieved surprisingly
little consensus on the character and size
of gains from economic development
projects. Measurement of such gains must
inevitably derive from a vision of the
labor market. For subsidies to generate
real gains for local workers, those workers
must be unemployed or underemployed.
Recent research on job chains provides
a natural approach to such measurement
issues. It addresses not only the number
of job vacancies created as a result of
a subsidized business investment or
expansion, but also the extent to which
gains are achieved by the unemployed and
the underemployed, whether skilled or
unskilled.
The tide of strong economic growth
at the state and local level lifts all boats.
Workers in regions experiencing such
growth are more likely to be employed,
more likely to work full time, and more
likely to take home a thicker paycheck
than workers in sluggish regions. Studies
by Bartik (1991, 1996) and others have
forcefully made such points. But state
and local governments seldom undertake
economic development projects on a
scale likely to affect the overall growth
rate of the state or local economy. Most
state and local efforts billed as economic
development projects take the form of
subsidies to a relatively small number of
private ﬁrms. Project analysts are left in

a quandary as to how to evaluate project
beneﬁts.
Any development project, whether
a new auto ﬁrm or an airline terminal,
announces new jobs, but the important
question is, “How much are these new
jobs really worth?” Wages generated by
the project often are touted by sponsors
as a dollar measure of beneﬁts, but many,
indeed most, of the workers hired into
new jobs are already employed. Hence,
the wage increases achieved by such
job changers are likely to be relatively
modest. Is this all a new job is worth?
Common sense suggests there must be
more. The natural question under the
circumstances is to ask what happened to
the jobs left vacant by the job changers.
Of course, then we want to know what
happened to any other vacancies left open
further down the chain.
To value a new job, we need to value
the gains made all along the job chain
set in motion by the appearance of that
job. For those eager to get to the bottom
line, our estimate is that for every dollar
of wages in a newly created job, the
economic beneﬁt is about 50 cents. That
is a big discount on new payroll, but it
still leaves a lot more than just the wage
increases to new hires in the project itself.
Below, we describe our logic for reaching
this estimate using job chains.
Simulating Job Chains
The chain metaphor has been used
to analyze a wide variety of markets
involving durable goods, such as housing.
Since every house has an address,
housing chain research proceeds in a
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straightforward fashion. Just ask the
incoming household of a new dwelling
where he/she/they moved from and then
go back to that unit and ask the new
household moving in there the same
question. Continue in this fashion through
successive vacancies until the chain ends
with an in-mover to the region, a newly
formed household, or a demolition.
Unfortunately, most jobs in the United
States lack an identifying “address” or
any other clear record independent of the
workers holding those jobs. In general, job
data are not collected as if jobs
are entities in themselves, to be ﬁlled,
vacated, or destroyed. Rather, job data
are gathered essentially as by-products of
collecting information on the individuals
who occupy them. While a number of
data sources allow researchers to track job
histories of sample individuals, virtually
none allow tracking of the successive
individuals employed in a given position.
Under the circumstances, the
possibilities for collecting data on actual
job chains are slight.1 The empirical
problem is very similar to that facing an
input–output (IO) researcher. After all,
an IO multiplier for an apparel ﬁrm is not
estimated by actually logging the sale of
cloth to that ﬁrm, then the sale of cotton
to the particular textile ﬁrm supplying the
cloth, then the sale of petroleum to those
speciﬁc farmers selling the cotton and so
on. Instead, IO researchers estimate an
average “input vector” for each industry,
assume those vectors to remain constant
whatever the use of the industry’s product,

and then “simulate” the necessary
character of production chains.
To use such a synthetic approach for
job chains, we need to deﬁne and measure
the equivalent of the IO input vector
for each type of new job. If we break
jobs down into discrete groups based on
wages or some other general measure of
quality, we simply ask what proportion of
vacancies in a job at level 1 are ﬁlled by
workers employed in level 2 jobs, workers
employed in level 3 jobs, etc. To ﬁll in
the elements of such a vector, we need
information only on a sample of those
ﬁlling vacancies—their new jobs and

“The tide of strong economic
growth at the state and
local level lifts all boats.”
their old jobs—or, if not coming from an
existing job in the region, their previous
labor force status.
Still following the IO model, we now
assume that the probability of a given
link in a job chain (e.g., the probability
that the vacancy opened at level 3 is
ﬁlled by a worker employed in level 5)
depends only on the level of the vacancy
being ﬁlled (e.g., level 3), and not on any
other characteristics of the chain (e.g.,
the chain began with a new job at level
1). With this key assumption, we need no
further information concerning job chains.
In effect, once we are armed with these
“input vectors,” we can synthesize the
expected character of chains.

Table 1 Basic Wage Group Transition Matrix (entries are column percentages)
Origin
Wage group 1
Wage group 2
Wage group 3
Wage group 4
Wage group 5
Unemployed
Out of labor force
In-migrant
Column sum

1
41.1
25.0
4.8
2.2
0.0
2.9
4.0
20.1
100.0

2

New wage group
3

4

5

52.9
22.1
1.5
0.3
3.8
3.8
15.6
100.0

46.6
18.5
2.4
9.7
7.5
15.4
100.0

47.3
13.3
15.8
13.5
10.0
100.0

34.5
24.7
30.5
10.2
100.0

NOTE: The data are from 1987 to 1993 and relate to heads and spouses in the PSID. Level 5 has a lower
bound at the national minimum wage. The upper bound for each wage group is about 50 percent greater
than the lower bound. See Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) for details including justiﬁcation for
triangularization.

2

This approach to job chains greatly
simpliﬁes empirical requirements. In
recent work on trickle-down and economic
development strategies, we use data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) to construct input vectors for
an average state for ﬁve classes of jobs
deﬁned by wage level.2 To build the input
vectors for a given job level, we only need
information on job changers. We do not
need observations on entire chains, but
only a representative sample of unrelated
chain links. Such data are available from
workers’ longitudinal job histories like
the PSID. Without ever creating a sample
of real job chains, we can now estimate
all the relevant coefﬁcients of the input
vectors (Table 1). Not surprisingly, the
largest entry in each column falls along
the diagonal. Depending on the wage
level, anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of
hires in jobs come from workers already
employed at the same level. But these
hires add little to economic welfare.
Gains must come from workers moving
up from one job to a higher one, or from
nonemployment.
Armed with these input vectors, it is
a straightforward matter to generate the
expected numbers of vacancies opened
in each wage group as a result of a new
initial job at any given level. These
simulations are exactly analogous to the
calculation of multipliers in IO analysis.
They give job-chain multipliers. For
example, a newly created job at level 3 is
associated with an average chain of 2.7
vacancies, including 1.87 vacancies at
level 3 itself, 0.66 vacancies at level 4,
and 0.2 vacancies at level 5 (Table 2). The
average chain is then terminated by the
hiring of an unemployed worker, someone
out of the labor force, or someone moving
into the state. Perhaps not surprisingly,
high-wage jobs like those at level 1 give
rise to longer chains than low wage jobs
like those at level 5. But the length of
a chain is not in itself a measure of the
chain’s value. To assess the worth of a
new job, we also need to know the welfare
gains made along the chain.
Valuing Average Chains
To the best of our knowledge, analysts
of housing chains and the like have

Employment Research

JULY 2004
Notes

Table 2 Job-Chain Multiplier Matrix
Wage groups
1
2
3
4
5
All groups

1
1.70
0.90
0.52
0.28
0.08
3.48

2
2.12
0.88
0.37
0.12
3.48

stopped short of calculating formal
economic welfare beneﬁts associated
with particular chains. But chains in
general and job chains in particular lend
themselves neatly to such estimation.
Again using the PSID data, we have
calculated the average welfare gain of
successful job applicants for each type
of vacancy. The contributions to these
averages of job changers are relatively
easy to estimate from the empirical data.
We simply count the actual increase in
wages of similar job movers in the PSID.
More difﬁcult are the gains attributed to
those moving from unemployment, out of
the labor force, or outside the region. Such
calculations are necessarily speculative. At
root, any estimate of the welfare gains of
these groups requires an evaluation of the
alternative opportunities available to such
workers. The gain, then, is the difference
between the wages taken and what was
given up. Again, see Persky, Felsenstein,
and Carlson (2004) for details of our
approach and sensitivity analyses.
Using these estimates of average
welfare gains of hires at each vacancy
level in conjunction with estimates of the
number of each type of vacancy opened
by a given chain, we construct estimates
of the total welfare gain associated with
each type of new job. In Table 3, these
welfare gains are expressed as a share of
the average wage of jobs at each level.
Thus, we estimate new jobs at the highest
levels (level 1 and level 2) generate
welfare beneﬁts equal to little more than
40 cents per dollar of wages. At the lowest
levels (level 4 and level 5), these beneﬁts
amount to more than 60 cents per dollar of
wages.
On average a job is worth about 50
cents per dollar of wages. Thus the normal
practice of counting up new wages will

Initial new job
3

1.87
0.66
0.20
2.73

4

5

1.90
0.39
2.28

1.53
1.53

considerably overstate the welfare gains
generated by economic development
projects. At the same time, just counting
the gains to those workers actually taking
the new jobs would set a much lower
gain than estimated here. What accounts
for this substantial discount? It is not job
changers in the state or locality, because
job changers leave behind vacancies for
others to ﬁll. If the entire chain consisted
of such moves, the cumulative increase
in wages would approach the wage of the
new job. Rather, the discount originates
in the opportunities facing those who
at start hold no job in the region—the
unemployed, out of the labor force, and
in-movers. Of these, our analysis suggests
that in-movers are the most important.
Virtually all the difference between the
two ends of Table 3 are accounted for by
the greater proportion of in-movers ﬁlling
level 1 vacancies as opposed to level 5
vacancies.
When it comes to economic
development projects, questions of
efﬁciency and distribution are very much
intertwined. A dollar of wages created
at the low end of the job distribution
has an efﬁciency beneﬁt more than 50
percent greater than a dollar at the high
end. This is not based on any notion of
diminishing marginal utility, although
such a proposition would only strengthen
the result. The simple logic here is that
new high-end workers had substantially
more attractive alternatives than new lowend workers. This result, too, seems much
like common sense.

1. The exceptions here are those jobs that are
well deﬁned in such organizational structures as
religious denominations. Hence, White’s pathbreaking efforts to trace job chains among the clergy
(White 1970). Also see Webster (1979) for an early
application of job chains.
2. The data are from 1987 to 1993 and relate
to heads and spouses in the PSID. Level 5 has a
lower bound at the national minimum wage. The
upper bound for each wage group is about 50
percent greater than the lower bound. See Persky,
Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004) for details including
our justiﬁcation for triangularizing the matrix in
Table 1.
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Table 3 Welfare Gains, by Initial New Job

Welfare gains as a share of wages

1
0.43

Wage group of initial new job
2
3
4
0.42
0.56
0.62

5
0.69

3

